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Abstract 
Executive pay regulation is widely discussed as a measure to reduce financial 
mismanagement in corporations. We show that the professional team sports industry, the only 
industry with substantial experience in the regulation of compensation arrangements, provides 
valuable insights for the regulation of executive pay. Based on the experience from 
professional sports leagues, we develop implications for the corporate sector regarding the 
establishment and enforcement of executive pay regulation as well as the level, structure, and 
rigidity of such regulatory measures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The year 2007 marked the beginning of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
Most of the world’s largest banks were on the verge of bankruptcy and survived only due to 
unprecedented bailout measures. Currently, regulators, shareholders, and managers are 
searching for measures to avoid such a crisis in the future. One of the most prominent 
proposals is the introduction of salary caps for corporate executives. The European Union has 
introduced caps on bankers’ bonuses, which will be in effect starting in 2011. The US House 
of Representatives has ordered regulators to set compensation rules, just as the Federal 
Reserve is pushing for a modification of top executive compensation, especially in the 
banking sector.  
The objective of executive pay arrangements is the alignment of shareholder and executive 
interests (Jensen and Murphy (1990), Bebchuk and Fried (2003)). Research focuses on 
executive compensation as an instrument to overcome agency problems (for surveys of the 
vast number of contributions, see Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), Murphy (1999), Core, 
Guay and Larcker (2003), and Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder (2007)). The recent 
financial crisis and the related bailout measures suggest that discussion of executive 
compensation should also include the eventual consequences of firm behavior on taxpayers 
and society. Potential instruments to moderate the relationship between executives, 
shareholders, and taxpayers, e.g., pay limits or taxes on excessive compensation, have not 
received much attention from research (see Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) and Faulkender, 
Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala and Senbet (2010), for two of the few examples). Although 
executive pay played an important role in the recent financial crisis, academic research has 
not analyzed the desired attributes, mechanisms, and implementation issues of pay regulation 
in corporations so far.  
The scarce research on executive pay regulation yields few implications for academic 
research as well as for implementation in practice. Professional sports leagues, with their 
experience in determining, implementing and enforcing salary caps and luxury taxes, are a 
unique resource for deriving insights into how a sector operates a compensation-related 
regulatory regime. In this paper, we illustrate what regulators, shareholders and managers can 
learn from pay regulation in major sports leagues. We analyze regulation through salary caps 
and luxury taxes in professional sports leagues, and discuss potential implications for 
executive pay regulation. In sports, salary caps, the maximum amount a team can spend on 
player salaries, and luxury taxes, taxes on excess salary payments, have a long tradition. 
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Examples of sports leagues with salary regulation are numerous: the National Basketball 
Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL) and the National Hockey League 
(NHL) each have a salary cap. Major League Baseball (MLB), as well as the NBA, have 
implemented a luxury tax. 
In our analysis we employ the analogy between professional team sports and corporations, 
where we consider team owners and shareholders, and star athletes and corporate executives 
as analogues.1 The professional sports industry has been recognized as a potential labor 
market laboratory by a number of researchers before (Kahn (2000), Rosen and Sanderson 
(2001), Szymanski (2003)). The transparency and the data availability of the sports industry 
(regarding compensation and performance) make professional sports a valuable resource for 
testing economic propositions (Lazear (1995), Kahn (2000)). Additionally, authors analyzing 
management-related and economic issues in the context of sports frequently state that the 
simple institutional framework in sports can provide a contribution on managerial and 
economic issues in other institutions, despite the specificity of the data employed in a 
particular study (See Duggan and Levitt (2002), for example). Previous studies that have 
derived insights for the corporate sector from professional sports are numerous and cover a 
wide range of topics. Wolfe, Weick, Usher, Terborg, Poppo, Murrell, Dukerich, Core, 
Dickson and Jourdan (2005) provide a comprehensive analysis of studies in the field of 
organization studies and management that draw on observations from the sports sector, 
covering topics as, for example, competitive advantage, stakeholder management, and team 
performance. In the economics literature, professional sports have also served as a context to 
derive implications on a broad range of issues, reaching from firm decision making (Romer 
(2006)) over team compensation dispersion (Bloom (1999), Frick, Prinz and Winkelmann 
(2003), Franck and Nüesch (2010)) to economic incentives for crime and corruption (Duggan 
and Levitt (2002), Levitt (2002)).  
In this paper, we analyze major North American sports leagues to attain the following 
research objectives: we show how the sector-specific idiosyncrasies of professional team 
sports have fostered pay regulation, and illustrate fundamental practices and consequences of 
pay regulation in major sports leagues. Further, we derive insights from regulation practices 
in professional sports and discuss, in how far these insights can and cannot be transferred to 
the corporate sector. In particular, we analyze to what extent self-regulation initiatives can 
improve the financial stability of a sector and mitigate external interventions. Our analysis 
further shows that collective bargaining over compensation can reduce managerial power in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. See, e.g., Kaplan and O’Reilly (2008) for an analysis of the CEO and Star Athlete comparison. 
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the pay-setting process and mitigates the necessity for external intervention. We also establish 
that pay regulation contingent on performance in combination with retained compensation is 
the more effective regulatory model compared to an absolute cap on compensation. We 
further show that pay regulation of collectives yields a trade-off between the desired 
regulatory effect and firms’ autonomy of setting individual compensation. A comparison of 
salary caps and luxury taxes shows that luxury taxes can be an advantageous alternative to 
salary caps. Luxury taxes reduce the net benefit of excessive compensation. Additionally, 
they lead to less distortions than salary caps and generate resources for redistribution. 
Contrasting hard and soft regulation, we find that soft regulation is less effective in limiting 
compensation but can provide additional incentives.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section II introduces the peculiar 
economics of professional team sports and outlines the major differences between the 
professional team sports industry and traditional sectors. We examine the differences in 
compensation practices between the sports sector and the corporate sector, and outline current 
pay regulation in both sectors. In Section III, we approach selected regulatory issues in 
professional sports leagues and discuss, in how far the insights gained from experience in 
sports leagues can be transferred to executive compensation in the corporate sector. Section 
IV concludes. 
 
II. COMPENSATION PRACTICES AND REGULATION IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM 
SPORTS AND IN THE CORPORATE SECTOR 
1. Introduction to the economics of professional team sports 
The professional team sports industry differs from traditional business sectors in a number of 
ways. Two particular economic peculiarities of professional team sports have led to the 
regulation of player salaries: competitive imbalance and the ruinous escalation of player 
salaries (Fort and Quirk (1995), Szymanski (2003)). First, there is a difference in professional 
sports between athletic and economic competition. From an athletic perspective, opposing 
teams are competitors. From an economic perspective, however, they are complementors. A 
single team cannot produce a marketable product. It needs at least one opponent. In team 
sports, leagues aggregate a number of teams and matches to produce a championship race. 
Fans prefer to attend matches with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close championship races 
(See Rottenberg (1956), Szymanski (2001), Borland and MacDonald (2003), Fort and Lee 
(2007)). Unlike enterprises such as General Electric, Wal-Mart, or Microsoft, which benefit 
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from weak competitors in their respective industries, the New York Yankees, the Los Angeles 
Lakers and Real Madrid need strong competitors to maximize their revenues. 
A further economic peculiarity of professional team sports is the associative character of 
competition. No club can improve its position in the ranks without simultaneously worsening 
the position of at least one other team. The position of a team in the ranks is closely related to 
the team’s financial success because teams with a better position receive more attention from 
fans, the media, sponsors, etc. The rank-order contest between teams may result in a rat race 
(Akerlof (1976)). As Whitney (1993) shows, teams tend to overbid each other for playing 
talent until they are close to bankruptcy. Recent developments in club finance in European 
football support this hypothesis. Many clubs are facing financial ruin after gambling on 
spiraling wages (Arnaut (2006), Dietl and Franck (2007), Deloitte and Touche (2009)). 
 
2. Compensation practices in professional sports and the corporate sector 
Next, we provide a brief overview on the difference in compensation of professional athletes 
and corporate executives. Kaplan and O'Reilly (2008) have analyzed the relationship between 
CEO and Star Athlete compensation. They find that the pay of executives and athletes is 
similar in the amount, but significantly differs in structure. Executives are compensated in the 
main part via variable forms of pay. There are a number of variable compensation 
instruments, e.g., bonus payments, restricted stock grants, grants of stock options, and long-
term incentive payouts. The variable elements amount to between 60% and 80% of total 
compensation, depending on the sector and the measure applied (Brookman, Jandik and 
Rennie (2006), Aggarwal (2008), S&P Execucomp data for the fiscal years 2007-2009).2 In 
particular the financial sector shows a very high percentage of variable, performance-related 
compensation (see Murphy (1999)).  
Compensation in the corporate sector is considerably more complex than in professional 
sports, where athletes’ pay is mostly a fixed salary, with only a minor variable part. In 
particular, compensation in professional sports consists of a fixed annual salary and of 
variable pay in the form of team and individual bonuses. Compared to the corporate sector, 
variable pay in professional sports is relatively small, accounting for between five and 25 
percent of total player earnings in the NFL in recent seasons, for example (Mondello and 
Maxcy (2009)). In other major sports leagues, this percentage is equally small, and frequently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.  We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing the relative proportions of fixed and performance-
based pay in executive pay to our attention.  
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restricted to a small proportion of players (Clayton and Yermack (2001), Heubeck and 
Scheuer (2003)).3 The NBA distinguishes performance pay that is tied to objectives which are 
likely to be achieved from unlikely achievements. Sign-in bonuses, which are fixed payments 
players receive when they sign a new contract with a team, constitute a further compensation 
component. Sign-in bonuses are frequently used in the NFL, but are not common in other 
major leagues.  
 
3. Pay regulation in the professional team sports industry 
The economic peculiarities of the sports sector have led to the introduction of pay regulation 
in the major sports leagues. Salary caps and luxury taxes, which are a surcharge on the part of 
a team’s payroll that exceeds a salary threshold, emerged in the US major leagues with the 
introduction of free agency and were installed as a counterforce to free player movement (Fort 
and Quirk (1995), Dietl, Lang and Rathke (2011)).4  The definition of salary caps and luxury 
taxes in collective bargaining agreements leads to an exemption of these measures from 
antirust action. Despite this exemption, major sports leagues are often considered as profit-
maximizing cartels, where pay regulation transfers rents from players to owners.  
Currently, all four North American major team sports leagues have a salary cap and/or luxury 
tax. The NBA in 1983 became the first league to introduce a salary cap and has a salary cap of 
US$ 57.7 million for the 2009/10 season. This cap limits the mount of money a team may 
spend on player salaries. In recent years, the salary cap has increased proportionally to the 
increase in the NBA’s revenues. The NBA salary cap is a so-called “soft” cap, meaning that 
in contrast to a “hard” cap, there are several exceptions that allow teams to exceed the salary 
cap to sign players. These exceptions are mainly designed to enable teams to retain popular 
players. In 1999, the NBA also introduced a luxury tax system for those teams with an 
average team payroll exceeding the salary cap by a predefined amount. These teams have to 
pay a 100% tax to the league for each dollar that their payroll exceeds the tax level. In the 
NFL, the “hard” salary cap in 2009 was US$ 128 million per team. The NHL operates with a 
hard salary cap such that each team had to spend less than US$ 56.8 million on player salaries 
in the 2009/10 season. The MLB does not have a salary cap. However, Major League 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.  In the NHL, only players on entry-level contracts, on one-year contracts, or players returning from long-term 
injuries can receive performance pay, for example.  
4. The reserve clause was introduced in baseball in 1887 and gave club owners an exclusive option to 
unilaterally renew the annual contracts of their players, binding them to their clubs until release, retirement or 
trade. In contrast, “free agents“ are players for whom no compensation is required and/or the original team 
has no matching rights. Therefore, free agents can freely offer their services to other teams. 
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Baseball became the first league to introduce a luxury tax in 1996 as part of its collective 
bargaining agreement. The threshold at which the luxury tax accrues was US$ 162 million per 
team in the 2009 season. It is important to note that there is significant heterogeneity between 
the major leagues regarding the design of salary caps (individual caps, rookie caps, etc.; for a 
comprehensive overview see, e.g., Kaplan (2004)).  
There is wide agreement in the literature that salary caps and luxury taxes improve 
competitive balance in sports leagues because they prevent wealthy clubs with high market 
potential from bidding the full marginal value for additional talent (Fort and Quirk (1995), 
Rosen and Sanderson (2001)). This effect allows less wealthy, small-market clubs to retain 
star players. Additionally, salary caps can enhance social welfare when they limit large teams’ 
spending (Dietl, Lang and Rathke (2009)). Moreover, a salary cap balances the salary 
distribution between players and increases club profits (Késenne (2000)). The welfare effect 
of luxury taxes is positive because league quality increases as a result of the combination of 
luxury taxes and redistribution of luxury tax proceeds (Dietl, Lang and Werner (2010)).  
However, teams have incentives to circumvent regulation through salary caps and luxury 
taxes, therefore monitoring and enforcement activities are necessary (Fort and Quirk (1995), 
Dobson and Goddard (2001)).  
 
4. Pay regulation in the corporate sector 
Up until the recent financial crisis, regulatory measures concerning executive pay could be 
summed up under disclosure requirements and intervention via taxes (Knutt (2005)). 
Disclosure regulation serves to increase transparency of executive compensation by requiring 
detailed listing of compensation packages, their components and levels. Research shows that 
increased disclosure enhances shareholder wealth (Lo (2003)). Tax regulation serves to 
disincentivize excessive compensation by making compensation above a threshold 
increasingly costly for corporations. One prominent example for such regulation is the tax 
deductibility limit of US$1 million for corporations (Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC)). This limit is accompanied by several exceptions, e.g., compensation for 
performance goals set by a corporation’s compensation committee and approved by a 
majority of shareholders, is not included in the deductibility limit. Payments deferred until 
retirement also are not included in the limit. Note that as a consequence to taxes on stock 
options, employee options are frequently granted as non-qualified options, which allows a 
compensation-expense deduction for corporations (Hall and Murphy (2003)).  
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In addition to disclosure and tax regulation, a number of corporate governance requirements, 
e.g., incorporated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, affect executive compensation (Dew-
Becker (2009)): The Sarbanes-Oxley Act disallows loans from corporations to their 
executives, sanctions erroneous financial statements, and requires independent compensation 
committees. As a result of these measures, affected corporations decreased executive pay 
considerably, mostly via reducing compensation via options rather than remuneration in cash 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)). Another regulatory intervention regarding corporate 
governance is the introduction of (mandatory or voluntary) “say on pay“. Say on pay 
increases shareholder influence on executive compensation by mandating a shareholder vote 
over executive pay. However, studies have found limited evidence that say on pay notably 
alters the level and design of CEO compensation (see Conyon and Sadler (2010), for 
example).  
The recent financial crisis and related government bailouts entailed a number of short-term 
regulations, particularly for financial institutions that have benefitted from the government’s 
support via bailouts (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act limits incentive pay via restricted stock at one-third of an 
executive’s total annual compensation, and the vesting period for the restricted stock must last 
until a firm has paid back the received bailout money, for example. 
 
III. INSIGHTS ON PAY REGULATION FROM MAJOR SPORTS LEAGUES  
This article illustrates regulation practices in the professional team sports industry and derives 
insights for the corporate sector. We have shown how the necessity for regulation in 
professional team sports comes from two peculiarities of the sports sector: the preference for 
balanced competition and the consequences of a rank-order tournament. The long tradition of 
pay regulation in North American major sports leagues make sports leagues a valuable 
resource for analyzing pay regulation. 
To the extent that the basic rationales for pay regulation in the sports industry have a 
corresponding counterpart in the corporate sector, i.e., there is an interrelatedness of firm 
objectives and there are collectively harmful races for individual returns, the discussion of pay 
regulation in professional team sports can generate immediate insights for the controversy 
over executive pay regulation.  
In settings, where such correspondency does not exist, comparative analysis of professional 
sports and the corporate sector has to establish, where insights from sports can and cannot be 
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transferred to the corporate sector, and indicate potential consequences of a transfer. In 
general, competitors in other sectors than professional team sports do not prefer balanced 
competition, but want to outperform their competitors. Only in specific settings, competitors 
are also complementors. For example, liquid financial institutions have incentives to support 
their competitors, for instance by private bailouts, to avoid contagion from illiquid banks 
(Leitner (2005)). Kaufman (1994) states that bank failure contagion and its potential damage 
has given several experts a reason to call for government regulation in the banking sector (See 
Corrigan (1982), for example). The concept of contagion and the related systemic risk imply 
that in sectors, which are potentially affected, there is an interest in maintaining a certain level 
of competitive balance between competitors.5 The rank-order tournament observed in sports 
leagues only exists to a limited degree in the corporate sector. Firms, by outperforming their 
competitors, can effect favorable reactions on the stock market, which gives them a relative 
advantage over their competitors. To the degree that firms’ competitiveness is determined by 
their relative stock market performance, the corporate sector shows similarities to the rank-
order tournament that characterizes professional sports. Corporations may find themselves in 
races for maximizing upside potentials of risk, with potentially harmful consequences 
(Faulkender, et al. (2010)). By regulating compensation, the discrepancy between upside and 
downside potentials can be mitigated. These observations show that there are instances, 
particularly when there is a tendency towards instability in a sector as observed in the credit 
crunch related to the recent financial crisis, where regulation of the corporate sector follows a 
similar logic as regulation in professional team sports.  
Beyond such instances, the insights can be valuable as a starting point for discussing the 
applicability and potential effects of existing and prospective regulatory measures in the 
corporate sector. Because of the difficulties to draw meaningful conclusions from recent 
approaches to executive compensation (Devers, et al. (2007)), deriving conclusions via the 
analysis of a laboratory is an attractive approach. While the findings from these experiments 
are not always easily generalizable, the available data and the related transparency of 
mechanisms at work makes professional sports a valuable source of insights (Lazear (1995)). 
In the following, we analyze regulation practices in major sports leagues. We discuss, where 
the insights obtained from professional sports can and cannot be transferred to the corporate 
sector, and point out potential implications of these insights for the corporate sector.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5.  Note that competitive balance generally plays a role in the analysis of regulatory questions in concentrated 
industries, where the regulator addresses public interest by limiting market power. 
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1. (Self-)Imposed rules and strict sanctions in case of transgressions ensure the common 
benefit of competitors  
Consider the following anecdote of an Englishman observing the process of riverboat towing 
in 19th century China. At that time, wooden boats were used to carry natural resources from 
inland China downstream to large coastal cities. After unloading, the empty boats were pulled 
back upstream by a group of men from the riverbank using a large tow. The Englishman was 
surprised when he saw that the men where whipped whenever they slacked down in their 
towing effort. He was shocked, however, when he learned that the men pulling the boat 
actually were the owners of the boat and had agreed to hire a monitor to whip them whenever 
necessary (Cheung (1983)). 
Owners of professional sports teams face a similar dilemma as the riverboat towers. The 
owners benefit from fan attention, and to generate and maintain interest in sports competition, 
they want to ensure balanced competition. Consequently, different teams’ payrolls and the 
resulting talent levels should be similar. Apart from this collective objective, individual team 
owners profit from a high league rank of their team. Because of the rank-order contest in 
professional team sports, the threat of an arms race emerges. So while the collective of club 
owners prefers balanced competition, each individual club owner tries to hire more talent by 
increasing his/her team’s payroll in an effort to move up in the ranking. In the end, all owners 
end up with higher payrolls without improving their individual ranks. Like the Chinese 
riverboat towers, club owners are aware of the dangers abandoning common objectives and 
impose restrictions on themselves, for example the regulation of players’ salaries (Fort and 
Quirk (1995)). They are also aware that each owner has an incentive to circumvent these 
payroll restrictions. Consequently, they also install a monitor, the league authority, to ensure 
that the restrictions will be enforced (Franck (2003)). 
Major sports leagues have reacted to the awareness that their business model can only be 
successful in the long run if they maintain self-imposed restrictions. In contrast to the 
corporate sector, the closed structure of major sports leagues additionally favors the 
effectiveness of self-regulation. Major sports leagues are focused on a small, homogeneous 
geographic region and team composition within a league is very stable. The coordinated self-
regulation of teams in major sports leagues leads to financial stability as well as solid rents for 
owners and players (Fort (2003)). Teams understand that the collective discipline of a number 
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of parties with similar interests is necessary to provide a basis for this successful coordination 
and therefore are willing to yield some of their autonomy.6  
When a sports team exceeds the salary cap - and the excess does not fall under one of the 
exceptions in the case of a soft salary cap - sanctions come into effect. Sanctions for rule 
violations are severe once a positive proof is obtained. The punishment may take on several 
forms: from financial penalties over suspension of the involved player to the loss of draft 
rights for one or more seasons. Professional team sports show that salary caps are only 
effective to the extent that they are well defined and enforceable (Dietl, Franck and Nuesch 
(2006)). Salary caps are circumvented frequently, and circumvention attempts are various 
(Fort and Quirk (1995)). Examples are the postponing of actual salaries to the future by 
signing undervalued contracts for a period of time until one of the salary cap exceptions 
allows high-value contracts (Staudohar (1998)), and teams underreporting revenues to pay 
lower salaries to their players (e.g., Quirk (1997)).  
Professional sports teams are in a unique position with respect to employment opportunities 
for star athletes. No sports league (in the disciplines of American football, baseball, 
basketball, and ice hockey) outside North America can compete with the major leagues 
financially and with respect to public attention. Consequently, star players do not have 
significant outside options. LeBron James of the Miami Heat cannot simply leave the NBA 
and join another league without suffering major income losses. Teams outside the NBA 
cannot offer the same level of compensation.7 Professional athletes thus show lower salary 
elasticity than executives, and a decrease in salary does not necessarily lead to immediate exit 
to a foreign league. In contrast, a bank executive could easily escape compensation regulation 
by starting to work for a bank, which is not regulated.  
Corporations can learn from the benefits of self-regulation in professional team sports. With 
regard to a pay regulation, firms and executives have similar incentives as those faced by 
professional sports teams and players. Executives prefer higher to lower pay, and firms want 
to attract and retain the best executives available; to attract the best executives, the 
compensation a firm offers also has to be the highest among its competitors. Consequently, 
circumventing the salary cap, although possibly harmful in a larger context, may be in the 
interest of both parties. This yields an exemplary situation of a moral hazard (Holmstrom 
(1982)). Circumvention can be achieved by spotting and exploiting potential loopholes in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6.  For an analysis of potential anticompetitive consequences of professional sports leagues as joint ventures see 
Flynn & Gilbert (2001). 
7. According to Forbes.com, James earned US$ 40m in 2009, of which US$ 16m were salary payments by his 
team. 
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salary cap mechanisms or by taking actions incompliant to defined rules, such as concealed 
agreements over side-payments or non-monetary compensation.  
Corporations generally have concerns about regulation because of a loss of autonomy and the 
danger of an exit of executives to other economies. To mitigate the effects of external 
regulation, self-regulation of sectors analogous to the practice in major sports leagues could 
be an alternative to government intervention. Self-regulation by sectors, for example the 
banking sector, already is common practice (Chatov (1975), Gunningham (1991), 
Gunningham and Rees (1997)). An extension of self-regulation to executive compensation 
could reduce the necessity of extensive government intervention. However, self-regulation 
initiatives for corporate governance by the European Union have shown that they can be 
successful only if mandatory compliance, monitoring and enforcement accompany the 
initiatives (De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005)). 
To ensure adherence to the salary cap and therefore its stabilizing effects, a regulatory entity 
has to install well-defined rules and enforce compliance with the salary cap. This becomes the 
more difficult, the more complex pay arrangements are. Executive compensation shows more 
components than athlete pay, which makes it more difficult to control total remuneration 
(Bebchuk and Fried (2006), Kaplan and O'Reilly (2008)). Exhaustive categorization and 
publication of compensation components is therefore necessary to enable effective regulation 
and address potential loopholes that are not in the regulator’s interest (See, e.g., Posner (2009) 
and Faulkender et al. (2010)).  
The effectiveness of regulation in major sports leagues strongly depends on the coordination 
of individual teams to establish and enforce regulatory arrangements. For the corporate sector 
this implies that strong coordination efforts are vital for effective regulation, self-imposed as 
well as external, of business sectors and national economies, e.g., to limit outside options for 
executives by international implementation of regulatory measures (as addressed by Acharya, 
Wachtel and Walter (2009)). Compared to professional sports leagues, the difficulty of 
coordinating business sectors, or even entire economies, limits the extent to which the insights 
on self-regulation from professional sports can be transferred to the corporate sector. 
Nevertheless, regulators have undertaken various coordination efforts in the recent past. The 
2009 G-20 summit, which had salary caps for executive compensation on its agenda, is one 
example of concerted effort to avoid executive migration away from regulated economies.  
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2. Collective bargaining ensures sustainable operations 
In professional team sports, salary caps and luxury taxes are established via collective 
bargaining between the players’ union and the team owners. Both sides negotiate general 
work conditions, including the maximum (and in some cases minimum) percentage of league 
revenues, which players can receive as salaries (Késenne (2007)). As this percentage is 
established via a collective agreement, antitrust law cannot be applied to the bargaining 
outcome, including the salary regulations (Jacobs and Winter (1971), Marburger (1997)). 
Many other ways of regulating salaries, such as the dictation of salary caps by team owners, 
would be prohibited by antitrust law (Rosner and Shropshire (2004)).  
The North American major leagues show that collective bargaining between principals and 
high-income agents can ensure sustainable levels of compensation as well as financial 
stability of a league and its teams. The collective bargaining process allows both team owners 
and players to voice their interests and continue the bargaining until they reach a bilateral 
agreement. Homogeneous interests give team owners an advantageous bargaining position 
opposite to the players, who face more coordination problems because of their number and 
the resulting range of interests. In contrast, player talent shows low substitutability and supply 
of skilled labor in the past was limited, which gave the players an advantage (Rosen and 
Sanderson (2001)). However, at present major sports leagues’ increasingly global sourcing of 
playing talent worsens players’ bargaining position. In the case that an agreement on a salary 
cap or luxury tax cannot be established, a strike (by the players) or lockout (by the teams) 
may occur. This can result in the partial or entire loss of a season, as has occurred in the 
recent past, for example in the 1998/99 NBA and 2004/05 NHL lockouts (Staudohar (1999, 
2005)). The forgone earnings related to lockouts pressure both team owners and players to 
reach an agreement. 
Executive pay in the corporate sector usually follows recommendations from different parties 
(management, human resource department, outside accountants, compensation consultants) 
and is either accepted or rejected by the compensation committee, which consists mainly of  
outside directors (Murphy (1999)). There exists concern about a lack of independence of 
compensation committees, as well as the influence of managerial power on executive 
compensation (Murphy (1999), Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002)). Collective bargaining in 
major sports leagues provides insights for executive compensation in the corporate sector. 
Collective bargaining between shareholders on the one side of the bargaining table, and 
executives on the other, increases direct shareholder participation in the setting of executive 
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compensation and reduces managerial power in the compensation setting process. Therefore, 
collective bargaining yields more transparent outcomes for the shareholders. However, there 
is an important caveat to the transfer of the insights on collective bargaining to executive 
compensation: if shareholders and executives collectively bargained over compensation 
arrangements, they would not automatically include perspectives outside the scope of their 
interests. Regulatory intervention would thus still be necessary to eliminate incentives with 
potentially harmful external effects. The regulator, as the controlling instance, has to ensure 
that shareholders and executives do not disregard taxpayer interests, for example.  
The bargaining parties in professional sports leagues are team owners and players. For the 
corporate sector, the choice of bargaining parties is not obvious. Collective bargaining could 
take place between shareholders and executives within one firm, within one sector, or within 
national or international boundaries. The coordination costs of a collective bargaining process 
rise with the spread and sector specificity of bargaining parties. The regulator would have to 
address this conflict between coordination costs and the comprehensiveness of the bargaining 
outcome. Another issue in the transfer of the insight that collective bargaining can be applied 
to executive compensation is the bargaining power of the participating parties: a small 
number of executives face a large number of shareholders. Additionally, executives’ interests 
are very homogeneous. These aspects contribute to a favorable bargaining position of 
executives and would therefore impact the bargaining outcome. In sports leagues, both 
owners and players select representatives to be able to concentrate their interests. For the 
corporate sector, this would imply a dominant role of shareholder representatives on 
compensation committees.8  
Regarding the applicability to specific sectors, it has to be noted that professional sports teams 
allocate large fractions of total revenues to a small number of employees with highly 
developed sector-specific skills. The process of collective bargaining, which has proven 
useful in the sports sector, may thus be most effective in business sectors displaying a similar 
personnel quality and salary structure, such as the financial sector.  
Recent changes in executive pay policies toward more shareholder influence underline the 
relevance of the principle of collective bargaining in the corporate environment. The “Say on 
Pay” initiatives in, e.g., the US and the UK support this impression. These initiatives aim at 
introducing the right for shareholders to vote on executive compensation proposals and have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8.  Note that the caveat that shareholders and executives, despite engaging in something like collective 
bargaining, would not automatically include perspectives outside the scope of their interests, also holds in the 
case of fully independent compensation committees (see Bebchuk and Spamann (2010)). 
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achieved this in several major economies already (Cavanagh and Sadler (2009), Dew-Becker 
(2009), Conyon and Sadler (2010)). However, there is limited evidence that say on pay 
significantly alters the level and design of CEO compensation (Conyon and Sadler (2010)). 
Additionally, in contrast to major sports leagues, where the outcome of collective bargaining 
is binding for all teams and players, the corporate sector faces discussion over whether 
mandatory or advisory say on pay is the preferable alternative (Dew-Becker (2009), Bebchuk 
and Spamann (2010)). 
 
3. Collective regulatory measures can limit total compensation and, at the same time, secure 
autonomous decision-making in the corporate sector 
All North American major sports leagues operate with collective pay regulation. There are 
salary caps and luxury taxes for entire teams.9 These collective measures ensure the financial 
viability of team operations because they determine total salary spending. At the same time, 
this practice allows teams (to a large extent) to freely allocate the total amount defined by the 
salary cap to individual players (Staudohar (1998)). An NFL team, for example, might invest 
the full amount of the salary cap in the quarterback and employ cheap players for all other 
positions. At another extreme, it might pay each player an identical salary. In general, given 
constraints such as the availability of talent, conformity to league rules about acquiring 
players of opponents, and other side restrictions, teams are free to make their optimal 
decisions.  
However, this freedom of salary distribution does not lead to arbitrariness in a team’s 
decision-making. Teams consider different aspects such as their league standing, fan demand 
and advertisers’ preference for team success and star players when they make their decisions 
on how much to spend on whom (Scully (1974), Scully (2004)). Consequently, the freedom 
of allocation of the salary cap in general does not lead to extreme allocations and is also an 
important instrument for teams to adjust to the preferences of their stakeholders (Frick, et al. 
(2003), DeBrock, Hendricks and Koenker (2004)). 
Individual athlete performance is observable and quantifiable, which is an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of collective pay regulation in professional team sports. 
Consequently, as there are no incentives to shirk when compensation includes continuous 
information on the past marginal product, the largest proportion of players’ compensation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9.  Individual pay regulation only occurs, when a league allows exceptions to the collective measure and there is 
the danger of excessive individual player salaries. 
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comes from their base salaries (in analogy to Fama (1980)); performance-related pay only 
constitutes a small percentage of player salaries (Kaplan and O'Reilly (2008), Mondello and 
Maxcy (2009)). Athletes earn their contracted salary independent of their scoring average or 
their teams’ win percentage. One vital extrinsic incentive for athletes to perform well is 
related to long-term career concerns: strong performance improves a player’s bargaining 
power in future contracts. The weight of this incentive, in combination with intrinsic 
competitive motivation and other financial benefits related to commercial endorsements, 
renders performance-based pay apart from fixed salaries less necessary (Krautmann and 
Oppenheimer (2002)). These observations have two consequences on collective regulation: 
players do not have incentives for shirking under collective regulation, and regulation is 
facilitated because compensation arrangements have a simple structure. Experience from 
major sports leagues implies that collective salary regulation limits excessive compensation 
and at the same time preserves teams’ autonomy in allocating individual compensation.  
The insights on collective pay regulation in professional team sports can be transferred to the 
corporate sector. Just as athletic competition ensures that a quarterback has strong teammates, 
executive pay would not be concentrated on a single individual, neglecting other positions in 
executive boards. Instead, a collective salary cap enables an allocation of compensation 
aligned with each firm’s objectives. If regulators dictated a corporation how much to spend on 
each executive, this would eliminate the corporation’s capacity to act optimally contingent on 
the market situation and inhibit its ability to address agency problems (Eisenhardt (1989), 
Carpenter and Sanders (2002)). The regulator, apart from the regulation objective, has to 
consider this dependence of corporations on their autonomy (Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002)). 
Collective instead of individual regulatory arrangements, for example by imposing a cap on 
bonus pools for executives in corporations, could therefore be a less restrictive alternative of 
regulating executive pay. 
Compared to professional team sports, where athlete performance is observable, an 
executive’s contribution to firm performance is less transparent. Most empirical studies thus 
focus on executive compensation and firm performance, and not individual performance (see 
Murphy (1985), Murphy (1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1992); 
Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1996) outline the problems related to individual executive 
performance and compensation). Although the individual performance of executives is 
difficult to measure, performance-pay constitutes a substantial fraction of total compensation 
(Murphy (1999)). Collective pay regulation, for example a limit on a corporation’s bonus 
pool, would not infringe this practice. However, the interaction of little transparency of 
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performance and collective regulation implies difficulties in the corporate sector: the 
allocation of regulated pay would lead to intensified conflicts over who receives what fraction 
of the capped bonus pool. As opposed to professional sports teams, where the performance of 
individual athletes is very transparent, these conflicts are intensified by the difficulty to 
measure individual performance in the corporate sector. Additionally, individual executive’s 
ability to appropriate rents from a collective pool would not necessarily coincide with the 
executive’s contribution to firm performance (Bebchuk, et al. (2002)).  
In the discussion of collective pay regulation it is important to note that in contrast to 
professional team sports there is no fixed size of executive boards. Consequently, adequate 
collective regulatory measures for different sizes of executive boards are necessary to 
guarantee uniform treatment of individual firms. The regulator has to consider the resulting 
room for manipulation, because corporations could appoint dummy members of the executive 
board to mitigate regulatory restrictions, for example.  
Experience from major sports leagues shows that collective regulatory arrangements can limit 
excessive compensation. It is not straightforward to see, whether they can also incentivize 
executives to take fewer decisions with negative externalities on society. Individual measures 
can achieve this objective more accurately. However, they strongly impair corporations’ 
autonomy in setting executive pay. This autonomy is vital for corporations, therefore 
collective pay regulation in professional team sports can yield important insights for the 
regulation of executive compensation in the corporate sector.   
 
4. Pay regulation contingent on performance with retained compensation correcting for 
substandard performance reduces focus on short run 
In the major leagues, pay regulation in the form of salary caps and luxury taxes of both 
absolute and relative nature can be found. An absolute salary cap, e.g., can be understood as a 
limit to compensation defined independently of financial performance, i.e. it is a fixed amount 
of money. A relative salary cap, the predominant form of salary regulation, can be defined as 
the proportion of a financial statistic such as revenue or profits. In this case, financial 
indicators determine the actual extent of the regulatory measure. In the major sports leagues, 
salary caps for entire teams are set relative to projected league revenues of the current season 
(Marburger (2006), Dietl, et al. (2009)). For instance, in the NBA, teams and players have 
agreed upon a payroll cap for each team of 57% of projected basketball-related income of the 
league (BRI, i.e., gate revenues, TV contracts, merchandizing, and others), divided by the 30 
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teams in the league. In the MLB, as another example, the luxury tax threshold is independent 
of revenues.  
Salary caps for individual players, as they exist in the NBA, can be relative or absolute in 
nature. The individual salary cap for an NBA player is contingent on the number of years he 
has played in the league and also depends on the payroll cap. The longer a player’s tenure in 
the NBA, the higher is his individual cap. Additionally, the cap is either a fixed amount or a 
percentage of the payroll cap, whichever figure is higher. Note that in the past, the fixed 
amount was always smaller than the percentage of the total payroll. This shows that absolute 
salary caps do exist but are not binding if there is a choice between an absolute and a relative 
cap. The other North American major leagues considered in this work show analogous 
patterns with respect to the choice between absolute and relative salary caps. 
The dominance of a salary cap in proportion of total league revenues stems from a number of 
advantages: a salary cap of this form aligns team owner and player interests, because players 
face less restrictive caps when the league is more successful financially. At the same time, 
this practice ensures a league’s financial viability because salary payments are limited to a 
proportion of total earnings. Additionally, if total earnings fall short of projections, there are 
mechanisms which ensure that teams do not have to pay salaries that exceed their actual 
earnings. For example, the so-called escrow system allows the NBA’s teams to withhold eight 
to ten percent of player salaries until actual BRI is known. The withheld money in the 
league’s escrow account is only paid to the players if BRI meets projections and can therefore 
be considered as a form of retained earnings.   
In the corporate sector, opinions diverge over whether executive pay should be capped at a 
certain absolute amount or whether it should be capped relative to a company’s earnings. The 
Obama administration discussed a $500,000 salary cap on yearly cash compensation for 
executives in firms receiving TARP funds and imposed a limit on restricted stock incentive 
pay at one-third of total annual compensation.10 The heads of state of England, France, and 
Germany have discussed the introduction of salary caps for executives, which are determined 
relative to a company’s revenues.  
The dependence of pay arrangements on performance measures influences risk-taking 
behavior. Excessive risk-taking by executives and the related lack of consideration for future 
consequences of present decisions is a vital topic in current discussion over executive 
compensation (Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), Faulkender, et al. (2010), Walker (2010)). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
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Major sports leagues imply that pay regulation should refer to actual performance, but also 
that the regulator should be able to adapt pay levels in cases where overall sector performance 
is below expectations. In the case of professional team sports, a salary cap that allows for 
stricter limits if league revenues turn out lower than projected ensures financial viability of 
present and future operations.  
In the corporate sector, different forms of compensation, e.g., stock options and restricted 
stock with vesting schedules, can serve the purpose of holding executives accountable for 
their decisions in future periods. Consequently, firms award stock options and restricted stock 
despite the increased cost of awarding risky future claims to executives (See Core, Guay and 
Larcker (2003), for an overview).  
Stock options are related to several incentive issues (Murphy (1999)), and via these issues 
also are different from the escrow system in professional sports in a number of respects: 
Options induce riskier investments because they increase in value with higher stock-price 
volatility. Additionally, options lose their incentive effect once the stock price is small enough 
to yield an exercising of the option unattractive.11 This has resulted in controversy over the 
repricing of options and related incentive effects (Acharya, John and Sundaram (2000), Core, 
et al. (2003)).  
Stock options can yield incentives to account for the future impact of executives’ decisions, 
for example, via their vesting periods, and therefore can be considered a type of retained 
compensation. However, they also entail a number of incentive issues that are not in the 
interest of shareholders and taxpayers. The use of stock options has decreased in the recent 
past, and firms have increased the use of restricted stock (Carter, Lynch and Tuna (2007)). 
Restricted stock on average vests after periods of three to four years, a time period which has 
been shown to be smaller in firms with less effective corporate governance (Chi and Johnson 
(2008)). It has also been noted that restricted stock can incentivize excessive risk-taking, if it 
is issued as common (as opposed to preferred) stock (Bebchuk and Spamann (2010)).  
Following these observations we can summarize that while the escrow system in professional 
sports leagues imposes identical restrictions on all teams and athletes, the long-term 
incentives of restricted stock in part depend on individual firms’ governance and accounting 
procedures. Additionally, there is a difference in the scope between restricted stock and the 
escrow system in sports: while all teams and athletes are confronted by the escrow system, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11. Another incentive effect of options is that they reward only stock-price appreciation and do not include 
dividends, which leads to executives avoiding dividends.   
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only about two thirds the S&P 1,500 Index firms award restricted stock, mostly R&D 
intensive firms (Murphy (1999), Blouin and Carter (2010)).12 Regarding the design of future 
risky claims in the corporate sector, it has to be added that, apart from the objective of 
aligning the incentives of shareholders and executives, stock options and restricted stock 
frequently are used because of accounting and tax motivations (Core, et al. (2003)). This 
observation poses the question to what extent the current design of such forms of 
compensation meets the objective of overcoming myopia in executives’ decision-making.     
An important point in discussing the transferability of insights on retained compensation from 
sports to the corporate sector is the different time horizons over which executives and athletes 
influence their respective organization’s success. Athletes’ actions almost exclusively affect 
their teams’ short-term performance, and via the escrow system, they are also held 
accountable for their performance over the corresponding time period. In contrast, corporate 
executives’ decisions can influence firm performance for years. The sports industry, where 
athletes receive the escrow pay after actual realization of overall outcome, implies that the 
period of time for which the regulator retains a percentage of earnings, should depend on the 
permanence of executive decisions. The longer the effects of decisions persist in the future, 
the longer the period of maintaining an equivalent to the escrow account should turn out. The 
transfer of insights from professional team sports to the corporate sector in this regard is 
limited to the extent that the different horizons, over which athletes and executives influence 
their organizations, generate different implications for compensation. For example, there can 
be a discount that executives apply to retained compensation, because the payoff occurs at a 
future date.13 Such discounts imply that higher levels of compensation are necessary to retain 
executives and maintain incentives, in particular because not all firms use retained 
compensation. Uniform treatment of retained compensation across firms, potentially with 
reference to their particular sector, would mitigate the pressure to compensate executives for 
lagged payoffs, and would effect that the realization of firm performance and executive 
compensation converged. One major challenge for such a measure is defining the time period 
over which compensation should be retained, as well as the fraction of compensation that 
should be retained.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12. A similarly low presence holds for long-term incentive plans, based on the rolling average of cumulative 
performance, for example. 
13  For example, Kahl, Liu and Longstaff (2003) show the costs stockholders associate with restrictions on the 
ability to sell awarded stock. 
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5. Luxury taxes lead to higher efficiency of talent allocation than salary caps 
The major leagues show different approaches to the limitation of player salaries, involving 
both salary caps and luxury taxes. The NFL, for example, operates with a salary cap. The 
league has to approve all contracts between a team and a player; therefore, the salary cap 
cannot be exceeded. The MLB, on the other hand, operates with a luxury tax. In the NBA, a 
combination of a salary cap and a luxury tax is in place. If a team’s payroll for players 
exceeds the luxury tax threshold, which is set above the salary cap, it has to pay a tax to the 
league for the overage. These examples show that in professional sports, the different 
measures achieve similar objectives (Dietl, et al. (2010)).  
A salary cap sets a strict limit on total compensation per team or per player. As a result, 
teams’ expenditures on talent converge. This leads to an improved competitive balance, but 
also to an inefficient allocation of talent. Players do not necessarily play for the team where 
their marginal productivity yields the highest return. In leagues with comparatively few 
games per season (e.g., an NFL team has 16 regular season games), the inefficient allocation 
of talent does not lead to forgone revenues. Almost all teams sell out all games. Other leagues 
have many more games, an MLB team, for example, has 162 regular season games. 
Consequently, it is more difficult to fill the stadium at every game, especially in large markets 
where alternatives abound. Large-market teams have to field stars to fill their stadia. In terms 
of the allocation of players with respect to their marginal return, these leagues require higher 
efficiency, i.e., the best players should play in the largest markets. Under the MLB’s luxury 
tax, rich teams can spend more on players than small teams, with the restraint that a luxury 
tax accrues. Given that large-market teams have a higher marginal return on talent, this leads 
to a more efficient allocation of playing talent. In this sense, the luxury tax is economically 
superior to the salary cap (Rosen and Sanderson (2001)). From an economic perspective, this 
could explain different regulatory regimes in different leagues (Scully (2004)).  
Luxury taxes show another important difference to salary caps: while they do not imply a 
strict salary limit, they generate tax revenues from teams that exceed the luxury tax threshold. 
The league can redistribute these tax revenues among smaller teams or use the revenues for 
pursuing collective league interests apart from balanced competition.  
Corporate executives should also earn according to their marginal product to ensure efficiency 
(Fama (1980)). Consequently, considering current practice in major sports leagues, a 
mechanism similar to the luxury tax in sports is preferable over a salary cap. A luxury tax 
allows pay according to an executive’s performance and the value the executive adds to a 
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firm. The tax controls pay by increasing a firm’s cost of executive pay, therefore there is a 
regulating effect. Luxury tax payments generate resources the regulator can redistribute or 
save in a fund for financial relief programs. However, a measure like the luxury tax only 
makes overage compensation more costly and does not strictly limit it. Salary caps do not 
allow such overage and therefore facilitate regulation.  
In the US, there exists a measure similar to the luxury tax in professional team sports: the tax 
deductibility limit of US$1 million for corporations (Section 162(m), IRC). A number of 
exceptions accompany the deductibility limit, thereby allowing corporations and executives to 
circumvent regulation by changing compensation practices. Most importantly, performance-
related bonus payments are not included in the deductibility limit. These exceptions have 
resulted in a recent increase of different forms of performance-based pay (Hall and Murphy 
(2003)). Note that this poses a contrast to compensation practice in professional sports, where 
performance targets are differentiated as likely and unlikely, and performance pay counts 
towards the salary cap, if the related performance target is likely to be achieved.14 Another 
important difference between Section 162(m) and the luxury tax in professional sports is the 
scope of the measures: while the deductibility limit is an individual threshold, the luxury tax 
in sports is a collective measure. The tax accrues for every dollar that a team’s payroll 
exceeds a specific threshold. Other measures, such as a 90% tax on bonuses in firms, which 
have accepted larger amounts of federal bailout funds, and charity rules to reduce 
connotations of greed also show similarities to the luxury tax in professional sports.  
There are several differences between measures found in the corporate sector today and the 
luxury tax in professional sports leagues: the luxury tax in team sports accrues to an aggregate 
measure of compensation that, in contrast to the corporate sector, comprises all pay except for 
the (almost negligible) fraction made up by unlikely to be achieved performance pay. Further, 
the luxury tax in professional sports, in contrast to similar measures in the corporate sector, is 
a collective measure applied to entire teams as opposed to individuals. Finally, in sports, the 
luxury tax proceeds are used for supporting sector-specific objectives.  
A transfer of these attributes of a luxury tax to the regulation of the corporate sector could 
limit the extent of shifting compensation elements towards tax loopholes and tax proceeds 
could be invested in industry stability funds. Additionally, the implications derived for 
collective regulatory measures discussed above, i.e., their less restrictive character, also hold 
for the concept of a luxury tax.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14. Of the (small) proportion of variable athlete compensation, the fraction of incentive pay for unlikely to be 
achieved performance targets is small, and capped at 25% of a player’s total salary in the NBA, for example.   
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6. Soft salary caps can impede regulation, but also reward experience and successful careers 
In professional team sports, the design of salary caps can take on two forms with respect to 
the rigor of the cap. A salary cap can be hard, that is, fixed and without exceptions, or it can 
be soft, that is, it can be adapted under specific circumstances. Hard salary caps in sports 
leagues ensure equal opportunities for competitors. Opponents may freely compete for players 
subject to the uniform salary cap. All competitors in a league face the same salary cap. Soft 
salary caps allow for individual exceptions to the salary limit under certain conditions. Teams 
can thus adapt to specific circumstances and spend more on very important and experienced 
players, for example. Soft salary caps are a less effective measure because exceptions are 
possible, and affected parties will try to exploit all available exceptions in their favor.  
In the major leagues, hard caps as well as soft caps can be found. The NFL, for instance, has a 
hard cap, meaning that total salaries paid in a season have to be below a certain limit. 
Otherwise, sanctions are imposed on the team that has violated the salary cap. The NBA, as 
another example, has a soft salary cap; a soft cap implies that there are numerous exceptions 
to the general salary limits. These exceptions lead to a large proportion of teams exceeding 
the salary cap to better adapt to team- and player-specific requirements. The NBA makes 
exceptions so that teams can hold on to merited players when their contracts expire. One such 
exception is named after former NBA star Larry Bird. To re-sign him, his team had to exceed 
the salary cap. As a consequence, the exception was introduced that a team could re-sign star 
players who either had played a number of years without being waived (i.e., fired) or had not 
changed teams as a free agent. If these conditions hold, the contract does not count towards 
the salary cap. This so-called “Bird exception” awards the privilege of retaining franchise 
players. Other exceptions, such as the “Early Bird” and “Non-Bird” exceptions, are installed, 
which allow moderate salary growth to players who have not been waived for two 
consecutive seasons or remain with their original team (for a comprehensive overview on 
exceptions to the NBA salary cap, see (Hill and Groothuis (2001)).  
Exceptions reduce the effectiveness of regulatory interventions. Where they apply, they relax 
the restrictions of installed regulations. This can undermine the regulatory mechanism to a 
degree where it becomes virtually ineffective, as the case of the NBA has shown. For 
example, Michael Jordan earned salaries of more than US$ 30m per season, where his salary 
alone would have exceeded the team salary cap. He signed these contracts under the Larry 
Bird exception, therefore they never counted towards the cap. Today, the NBA has eliminated 
this loophole by installing an individual salary cap.  
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For executive compensation such loopholes would have similar consequences and discredit 
the regulation attempt. The specific case of Section 162(m), IRC has shown how the 
definition of a regulatory measure can affect compensation practices and cause shifts from 
one way of compensation to another (Hall and Murphy (2003)). However, exceptions also 
allow the adaptation to specific circumstances and may therefore be used as incentives. In 
some major sports leagues, merited players face softer regulation than others.15 Similarly, 
experienced company executives with a solid career could face less restrictive salary caps. 
Just as this practice has incentive effects in professional sports, such an exception could also 
incentivize present and future executives to invest in continuous performance to be able to 
obtain exception status in the future. This way, pay regulation would shift a larger fraction of 
compensation for executives to the future, and regulation would reflect a seniority principle 
beyond current compensation practices (See Hutchens (1989), for example). Salary caps 
could therefore effect to render short-term-oriented, risk-taking behavior less attractive to 
executives.  
With the introduction of pay regulation in the corporate sector, the discussion of potentially 
relevant exceptions assumes increasing relevance. Current practice in professional sports 
incorporates the experience gained over several decades of pay regulation. Regarding the 
discussion of executive pay regulation, it can therefore serve as an indicator of future 
challenges for the regulator. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of executive compensation is currently widely discussed by regulators, 
shareholders, and managers. Fundamental economic analysis of the use and potential 
consequences of executive pay regulation is necessary to adequately account for this 
discussion. As a potential starting point for this research, professional team sports leagues 
provide a unique laboratory for deriving insights on the introduction, workings, and 
consequences of the regulation of executive compensation. We transfer these valuable 
insights to an analysis of executive pay regulation and illustrate what politicians, regulators, 
and economists can learn from major sports leagues. Key implications relate to the 
introduction, determining, and targeting of salary caps and luxury taxes, the discussion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In the NBA, the individual salary cap for a player becomes less restrictive, the longer a player has active in 
the league, for example.  
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luxury taxes as an alternative to salary caps, as well as the rigor and enforcement of these 
regulatory mechanisms. 
With the derivation of implications from practice in major sports leagues we want to 
contribute to the discussion of executive pay regulation. We see our contribution as a new 
perspective, which merits attention because of the success and the long tradition of salary 
caps and luxury taxes in professional sports. However, we are aware that the discussion of 
insights cannot take place without pointing out the institutional differences between 
professional team sports and the corporate sector. By accounting for the idiosyncrasies of the 
professional team sports industry, we obtain valuable insights on the extent to which pay 
regulation practices from sports can and cannot be transferred to the corporate sector. The 
analysis enriches the discussion of measures to regulate executive compensation with a new 
perspective. 
 26 
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